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ABSTRACT
This paper takes advantage of a rich data source for 18th
century financial history—John Castaing's Course of the Exchange .
This began publication in 1698 and appeared twice-weekly until
1811 when it became the official stocklist of the London Stock
Exchange sold in London. Using the daily stock prices for major
English companies and fortnightly stock prices for the same compa-
nies in Amsterdam (taken from the Amsterdamsche Courant ) , three
questions are posed and answered. First, why did a separate market
arise for English securities in Amsterdam? Second, what explains
the differences in prices that did occur between Amsterdam and
London? Third, how efficient were these markets, singly and in
combination, by comparison with modern markets for financial assets.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/stockmarketsofei996neal
The traditional date for the beginning of the English National
Debt is 1693. In that year, Act 4 William and Mary c.3 imposed a
special duty on beer, ale, and other liquors to guarantee payment of
the interest on a million pound loan which was to be floated at 10%
interest. (Carter, 1968, p. 5.) This was the first example of
William III applying to his new domain the same techniques for raising
credit that he had employed as Stadhouder in the Netherlands. To aid
him in raising money for the war against Catholic France, William
brought with him numerous financial advisors and military contractors.
Daniel Defore is credited with authoring a piece of doggerel that
lamented the preeminence of foreign counsel in William's affairs of
state:
We blame the King that he relies too much
On Strangers, Germans, Huguenots, and Dutch
And seldom does his just affairs of State
To English Councillors communicate.
(Ormrod, 1973, p. 17.)
Indeed, all three of the great joint-stock companies whose shares
were to constitute the first part of the perpetual debt of the British
government and which were to continue throughout the eighteenth
century as the major part of the Funds, had important elements of
ownership by foreigners. The Dutch were by far the most important,
represented first by Huguenots and then by Sephardic Jews. Far from
being suspected as an alien influence on state business, foreigners
were actively encouraged to become share-holders. Under the terras of
the Tunnage Act of 1694 which established the Bank of England, com-
missioners were appointed to accept subscriptions from "any person or
persons, natives or foreigners, bodies politic or corporate," and the
-2-
subscribers were to be incorporated under the title of "Governor and
Company of the Bank of England." (Richards, 1934, pp. 204-205.)
From the issue of its General Stock in 1657, the English East
India Company had been willing to accept foreign ownership of its
stock. However, its unwillingness to enlarge its stock issue during
the first decade of William's rule led directly to the formation of
the competing New English East India Company. The right of foreigners
to hold stock in the United East India Company (formed in 1702) was
confirmed in 1730 when an attempt was made to block the sale of cer-
tain shares belonging to the leading banking house of Amsterdam,
Andrew Pels. The company immediately pointed out "the damage that may
arise to the Discredit of the Company's stock if the proprietors
should be hindered transferring the same... especially as to merchants
abroad who lend money on the credit of it." (Chauduri, p. 446.)
In the original subscription lists for the South Sea Company,
founded in 1711, out of the 200 names of private individuals entered,
37 were Dutchmen, Italians, or Jews. (Carswell, p. 57.) Much of the
speculative fever that started the rise in south Sea stock in the ill-
fated year of 1720 has been attributed to the strong interest shown in
Amsterdam. (Wilson, 1941, p. 103.)
The shares of these companies were liquid assets for both English
and foreign owners due to the existence of an active resale market for
them. The trading activity occurred in the London Stock Market and in
the Amsterdam Beur s. The prices at which shares changed owners on the
London market are available to us on a daily basis in John Castaing's
Course of the Exchange. This remarkable data source began publication
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in March 1697 (McCusker, p. 31) and continued to appear twice-weekly,
on Tuesdays and Fridays, through the entire eighteenth century under a
variety of publishers. In 1811, when it was published by Wetenhall,
it was converted into the official price list of the London Stock
Exchange. Each issue gave price quotations for the past three days on
each of the major securities traded by the brokers in Exchange Alley.
These were headed by the shares in the great joint stock companies
—
the Bank of England, the East India Company, and the South Sea
Company.
For the prices on the Amsterdam Beurs , we have available an alter-
nate series of price quotations every two weeks for just the shares
of the Bank of England, the East India Company and the South Sea
Company. These were published by the Dutch economic historian, J.G.
Van Dillen in 1931. Van Dillen took his data from the Amsterdamsche
Courant
,
a Dutch newspaper which appeared fortnightly. Starting July
14, 1723 it began to give price quotes for shares of the Dutch East
India and Dutch West India Companies as well as the agio rate for the
Bank of Amsterdam. Then in the issue for August 9, 1723, the Courant
began giving in addition quotes for the three English joint-stock com-
panies. These continued to appear regularly in each issue, with
quotes for other Dutch and English securities coming in for a time and
then leaving, until December 19, 1794 when the French occupation of
Amsterdam and the founding of the Batavian Republic occurred. The
official price list for stocks on the Amsterdam Beurs began publica-
tion the following year. (de Vries, 1976.)
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This series by Van Dillen reduces the number of our observations
for each of the English companies from over 30,000 to only 1,676. For
each date in the Amsterdam series, I took the London quotation for
each company on the same trading day, producing six time series each
with 1,676 observations. Graphing both the levels and first dif-
ferences of the prices in each market against each other for each com-
pany makes it evident that the two markets were very closely corre-
lated from the beginning of the series. Unfortunately, these graphs
are far too long to reproduce here. However, Table 1 gives the corre-
lation coefficients between the first differences of the natural
logarithms of the price series in Amsterdam and London for the Bank of
England and the East India Company. These correlation coefficients
are quite consistent across the four peacetime periods that occurred
2between 1723 and 1794. And they are consistently high for each of
This exercise was complicated by two features: 1) the Dutch had
been on the Gregorian calendar since the middle/end of December 1582
while the British did not shift until September 2/13, 1752; and 2) the
Amsterdam market traded Sunday through Friday while the London market
traded Monday through Saturday. To deal with the first feature, I
counted back eleven days to find the corresponding London quotes
before September 13, 1752; the second feature was dealt with by
matching the Saturday quote in London to a Sunday quote in Amsterdam
whenever one appeared.
2
"From Keller's Dictionary of Dates (1934), I chose October 19, 1739
as the start of the first war period (War of Jenkins Ear) and October
1748 as the end (Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle) . Hostilities began for
the Seven Years War in August 1756 while for financial purposes in the
capitals they ended with the Treaty of Paris signed February 10, 1763.
I took March 13, 1778 as the effective date of hostilities in Europe
arising from the American War for Independence since this was when the
Treaty of Alliance of France and the United States was communicated to
England. This ends with the Preliminary Treaty with the United States
signed in Paris on November 30, 1782.
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Table 1
Correlation Coefficients between London and Amsterdam
Prices for Stock of Bank of England and East India Company
for 1723-1794 and Various Sub-periods of War and Peace,
(first differences of natural logarithms)
Period Bank of England East India Company
1723-1794 0.994 .993
Peace
8/23 - 10/19/39 0.966 0.979
10/43 - 8/15/56 0.949 0.977
2/10/63 - 3/13/78 0.966 0.979
11/30/82 - 12/30/94 0.969 0.980
War
10/19/39 - 10/48 0.961 0.980
8/56 - 2/10/63 0.911 0.957
3/13/78 - 11/30/82 0.896 0.940
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the three companies. One's first question upon finding two distinct
price series for the same financial asset—were the two markets in
which prices were struck closely integrated?— is answered here with a
resounding affirmative. There remain, however, several interesting
questions lurking behind this evidence of market integration.
The first question is historical. Why would there arise a separate
market for English securities in the Amsterdam stock exchange? The
second question is both economic and historic. What explains the pat-
tern of differences in prices that do occur between Amsterdam and
London? The third question, and the last one that can be treated in
this paper, is strictly economic. How efficient were these two mar-
kets, singly and in combination, by comparison with modern markets for
financial assets, due allowance being made for the slower pace of com-
munication and of trading activity in the eighteenth century?
I
The first question has been treated in the literature only fit-
fully and it may be useful to draw together some of the separate
threads of the story that have been woven to date. Each of the three
companies made explicit provision in their charters for the sale of
shares to foreigners. And this right of foreigners to hold shares
even in these quasi-governmental organizations was reaffirmed on
several occasions in the course of the eighteenth century. Especially
important as foreign investors were the Dutch. Their major involve-
ment in English public finance begins with the accession to the throne
of England by William III at the end of 1688. Van Dillen (1940, p.
-7-
584) gives a few of the more noteworthy examples. Moses Machado went
with the king to England in 1688 and became his prime contractor for
the campaign in Ireland; Joseph de Medina had a large contract as
military supplier in 1713; while Sir Solomon de Medina was the great-
est army contractor of his day, financing in particular the campaigns
of the Duke of Marlborough.
How large were these investments by the Dutch in the English
public debt? The question was of sufficient political importance in
1776 that Lord North reputedly had his staff determine the precise
extent of Dutch involvement at that date. Their figure, over 41 per-
cent, was effectively challenged by Alice Carter. (Carter, 1953a-c.)
Indeed, she even cast doubts that such a study was ever done. Her
independent estimate of the Dutch share in 1776 reduced the tradi-
tional figure to 25 percent. This was still at the high water mark
for the century according to her and by 1789 the Dutch were disin-
vesting rapidly. (Carter, 1959, p. 442.) Her analysis of the trans-
fers of Bank stock in the three month period, January 1 to March 31,
1755, shows that 59 of the 379 buyers (or 15.6%) in that interval were
residents of the Netherlands. And in the fourth distribution of divi-
dends to Bank shareholders in 1697, Carter found that nearly one-tenth
were distributed to Huguenots who had fled from France after 1680,
while Huguenots held 14% of the stock of the Million Bank. (Carter,
1975, pp. 83-90.)
In the most recent summary of the available studies, Wilson finds
that in 1723-24 the total foreign holdings of stock in our "Big Three"
companies amounted to 9.3 percent of the total capital. (Wilson,
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1980, p. 199.) By 1750 the total of foreign holdings in the same com-
panies (by now South Sea annuities had replaced the original stock)
amounted to 19.2 percent, (p. 201.)
The more interesting questions of the ebb and flow of Dutch in-
vestments in the English securities, particularly whether they were
destabilizing and speculative as contemporary English opinion had it,
or whether they were passive and on the whole stabilizing as both
Carter and Wilson believe, remain unanswered by their researches into
the archives of the English companies and the notarial archives of
Amsterdam. Indeed, Wilson argued in his 1959 comment on Carter's find-
ings that these questions could never be answered from the Dutch evi-
dence in probate records concerning the payments made of the Dutch
Collateral Succession Tax. Carter agreed but argued that the transfer
records of shares in the Bank of England and East India Company
archives would provide exactly the kind of evidence Wilson was seek-
ing. Only the transfer books for the Bank of England, however, pro-
vide the kind of evidence capable of linking foreign movements of
capital to sustained rises or falls in the market price of British
company shares. (Carter, 1955, p. 203.) To date the only use of
these records has been by Carter and then for only a three month
period at the beginning of 1755. (Carter, 1955.) The best that can
be done for the other stocks is to search for evidence that either of
the markets for English securities, the Amsterdam and the London stock
exchanges, were less than efficient in setting prices.
The first official mention of a stock market in London comes under
a law passed in the reign of William III, statute 8 and 9 William III,
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cap. 32. This provided for the licensing of stock brokers in the city
of London, the number not to exceed 100, and for each broker to wear a
silver medallion having the king's arms on one side and the arms of
the city of London with his own name on the other. This was to be
produced at the conclusion of every bargain. In 1720, the Bubble Act
(6 Geo. 1, cap. 18) limited the raising of stocks and trading in them
to those companies granted charters by Parliament. In 1734, Barnard's
Act (7 Geo. II, cap. 8) forbade all dealings in options and future
deliveries of stocks, with a fine of 500 pounds to be levied on each
person party to such a contract. (Postlethwayt , "Stock-jobbing".)
This latter act was persistently violated in fact, according to
Mortimer (1761). Nevertheless, the various price lists that have been
examined by Cope (1978) show prices either for money or for the date
at which the transfer books for the given security were to be opened.
Castaing's was consistent in showing prices at money although the
curious practice of printing the names of the 3ank of England and the
East India Company in capital letters may have developed to indicate
those securities in which dealings in time may have been possible.
(Cope, p. 18.) It is not until 1783 that a publication, Prince's
Price Current
,
gave both prices for money and for time, but even then
only for 3 percent Consols, the most speculative stocks in that
period. (Cope, p. 20.) This coincides with the hostilities of the
Fourth Anglo-Dutch War which helped complete the withdrawal of Dutch
investments from the English funds. (Cf. Riley, 1980.) The illegal-
ity of dealings in futures and options may not have eliminated the
practice in the London market— indeed, the introduction of stiffer
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bills in the House of Commons in 1745, 1756, 1771, and 1773 may indi-
cate the continued prevalence of futures trading—but it no doubt was
effective in eliminating the printed quotation of future prices for
those contracts that were made.
In Amsterdam, by contrast, the practice was always to deal in time
contracts since legally binding possession of shares in the Dutch East
India Company was not possible until the actual transfer of the share
or shares was entered in the Company's books. De la Vega's original
description of the Amsterdam Beurs in fact describes "putts" and
"refuses" in very modern terras for options trading. The extensive
trading of dealers with one another on both hedging and speculative
contracts in the same stock required regular "rescounter" settlement
dates to settle the net differences and straighten out the accounts
among the various brokers. These occurred quarterly, on the fifteenth
of February, May, August, and November. (de Pinto, p. 305.) The
quarterly rescounters may have been for the English funds only, since
de la Vega reports monthly rescounters, on the 20th of the month for
real stock with payment due the 25th, and on the first of the month
for "ducaton" shares. (de la Vega, introd. by Kellenbenz, p. xviii.)
Van Dillen notes the difficulties in deciding whether the figures
in the Amsterdamsche Courant were cash or time prices:
Until 1747 this is not mentioned, but in comparing
them with those found in brokers' notes preserved
from 1725 to 1737 it appears that in that period the
quotations are cash prices. In the year 1737 both
prices are sometimes mentioned. After this year we
find generally the forward rates. From 1759 onwards
the quotations are often followed by the name of the
next settlement month, e.g., "all of February." The
difference between the cash price and the next paying
month is, however, not more than a few percent.
(Van Dillen, p. 13.)
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If the Amsterdam prices quoted on the English securities were for
future delivery, then in general they should lie above the London cash
prices quoted on the same day. The following section of the paper
explains why this should be so and presents the results of two tests
determining if the quotations for the same securities at the same time
on the Amsterdam and London markets are really future prices and spot
prices.
II
Chart 1 is taken from the work of Louis Bachelier whose doctoral
dissertation, "La Theorie de la Speculation" in 1900 is regarded as
the first work to use modern probability theory to analyze the move-
ment of stock market prices. At regular intervals, dividends are paid
on each of our securities. If nothing else happened to disturb the
price of the shares from time to time A on the graph, the nominal
value of each share would be fixed until the dividend was paid, at
which time the value would rise abruptly. Cash transactions in the
shares between time and time A will take into account the forth-
coming dividend payment which the buyer of the share will receive. So
the cash prices between time and time A will show a gradual upward
trend along line OB. A contract made at time for future delivery of
the share at time A, however, will require the buyer to pay a
"contango" to the seller, equal in the absence of disturbances in the
price of the share to the dividend. This arises since the seller will
hold the share until the delivery date but will then yield possession
of the stock, and its dividend, to the buyer who only then will make
-11a-
Chart i
Equivalent Prices of Spot and Future Deliveries
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full payment. This means that the futures price equivalent for the
cash price that runs along line OB will be line CB, which always lies
above the cash price but gradually converges to it at dividend payment
dates
.
If Bachelier's exposition explains as well the differences between
Amsterdam and London prices, then the Amsterdam prices should be the
same as the London prices with only small random disturbances until
Barnard's Act in 1734 or until 1737 when Barnard's Act was made a per-
petual law. Thereafter, the expected level of Amsterdam prices should
be above London prices. Table 2 shows the results from comparing
Amsterdam and London prices for each of the three securities within
two sub-periods, August 1723 to December 1737 and January 1738 to
December 1794. The distribution of price differences makes it clear
that in the first period the chances were essentially the same for the
Amsterdam price to be the higher of the two as for the London price.
In the period 1738 to 1794, by contrast, the chances were over three
out of four that the higher price would occur in Amsterdam. Moreover,
the higher price in London, when it did occur, would be most likely
less than one point higher than the price in Amsterdam. The higher
prices in Amsterdam, by contrast, would lie one to three points above
the London prices.
This evidence certainly points in favor of our hypothesis; is it
possible to be more rigorous? Table 3 presents regression results for
the simple linear regression of the difference between the Amsterdam
and London price at a given date on the number of days from that date
to the payment of the next dividend. Only the Bank of England and
-13-
Table 2
Comparison of Amsterdam and London Security Prices for the
Sub-periods 1723-1737 and 1738-1794
Panel A. 1723-1737
Number of times price was higher in:
London Amsterdam
3 or > 1 to 3 to 1 to 1 1 to 3 3 or >
Bank of England
15 72 63 66 60 43
Total = 150 Total = 169
East India Company
44 88 47 36 45 69
Total = 179 Total = 150
South Sea Company
17 59 82 92 51 33
Total = 158 Total = 176
Panel B. 1738-1794
Bank of England
12 79 183 322 447 219
Total = 274 Total = 988
East India Company
52 123 128 186 373 417
Total = 303 Total = 976
South Sea Company
15 89 181 327 508 128
Total - 285 Total = 963
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Table 3
Regression Results for Le Bachelier Model
of Amsterdam-London Price Differences
P - P = B
n
+ B. (No. of Days to Next Dividend)
A Li U J.
Stock Time Period B^ B, R^ D/W
Bank, of England
*0 h i
-0.84 0.014 .28
(-3.55) (7.33)
1723-1737 1.92
1738-1794 -0.13 0.015 .23 2.02
(-1.16) (15.20)
1748-1756 -0.15 0.011 .18 2.02
(-0.69) (5.63)
1763-1778 -0.36 0.017 .34 2.04
(-2.22) (11.69)
1782-1792 -0.24 0.019 .19 1.99
(-0.69) (6.02)
East India Company
1723-1737 -0.90 0.013 .09 2.01
(-3.41) (5.37)
1738-1794 0.01 0.020 .17 2.05
(0.08) (13.05)
1748-1756 -0.32 0.022 .27 2.05
(-1.04) (7.51)
1763-1778 0.16 0.023 .19 2.09
(0.42) (6.71)
1782-1792 0.36 0.021 .16 1.77
(1.11) (6.63)
2Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. R is adjusted for
degrees of freedom. Equations with D/W in range of 1.9-2.0 have been
adjusted with Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
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East India Company stocks are analyzed since the South Sea Company
stock was essentially dormant for most of the period after 1730. The
results are adjusted for autocorrelation using the Cochrance-Orcutt
procedure. They also give supporting evidence for the hypothesis.
Only in the pre-Barnard Act period does the constant term in the
regressions become statistically different from zero, and it does so
for both the Bank of England and the East India Company. For the
entire period 1738-1794 and for the three peace-time periods within,
the constant terras are insignificantly different from zero. This
implies both that the contango rate was on average the same as the
dividend rate, which we should expect in the absence of persistent
expectations for things to improve or to deteriorate, and that no
serious barriers existed to equalizing the rate of return on the same
financial assets in the two different countries.
The presence of a significantly different from zero constant term
that is negative in the pre-Barnard Act period could imply segmented
capital markets or exuberant outlooks by speculators, but only if in
fact the Amsterdam prices are forward prices consistently. More
likely they are not and the regression line is forced down by the
recurrence of cash prices. It is interesting that on average the
Amsterdam price was higher than the London price even in the period
1723-37, although the difference was much less than it became after
1737. This holds for both stocks.
There remain differences between the regression estimates for the
Bank of England stock and the East India Company stock. On average,
the price difference was 1.6 points for Bank stock and 2.5 points for
-16-
East India stock. This reflects the generally higher dividend rates
paid by the East Company stock. The higher coefficient for B
1
in the
East India Company regressions reflects this fact. The gradual rise
in the B. coefficient over the 1738-1794 period for the Bank of
England regressions is a mystery, especially in light of the nearly
constant level of the B coefficient in the East India Company
2
regressions. Finally, it may be noted that by far the highest R is
reached for each stock in the period 1748-1756. This may be because
our peacetime period is more clearly and unambiguously defined for
these years, but it may also be because the commercial and financial
relations between England and Holland were less troubled by legis-
lative interference, financial disruptions, and political stresses in
this period than in the later peacetime periods.
In sum, these regression results, combined with the evidence of
extremely tight market integration presented in the introduction,
demonstrate that what small, but persistent differences in prices
remained between the Amsterdam and London markets for the British
securities were due to the London prices being cash, or spot, prices
while the Amsterdam prices were, at least after 1737, forward prices.
This finding permits us to ask some of the same kinds of economic
questions about the efficiency of the two markets, cash and forward,
that are posed in the current literature.
Ill
Table 4 gives the initial results of time series analysis on the
four main time series of interest— the cash prices for Bank of England
-17-
and East India Company stock quoted in London, and the forward prices
for the sane two stocks quoted in Amsterdam. Basically, we are
interested in testing the proposition that the following equations are
accurate descriptions of price movements in each case:
1} p\+i "
pi
t
= u
t+r i
= x
> 3; l = time
2) Q t+1
- Q = u
t+1 ;
i = 1,3; t = time
where P is the cash price and Q is the forward price.
Using the straightforward method of Ordinary Least Squares re-
gressions to estimate these equations, we would hope that in
regressing current P or Q upon the lagged value of P or Q that the
constant terra would be zero and the estimated coefficient upon the
lagged value would be one. This would mean that a speculator inter-
ested in making money by predicting correctly price swings in these
markets, without bothering to learn anything about underlying move-
ments in the determinants of supply and demand of the traded items,
would be stymied. The best prediction he could make would be that the
next period price would be the same as the last period price plus or
minus a random disturbance.
In fact, such regressions perform quite well, but they are not
presented here since they are biased to support this outcome, the more
so the longer the time series in question. Since these are very long
time series, they perform very well indeed in these regressions. This
is so since the longer the time series, the closer one comes to
regressing a given time series simply on itself. What then becomes of
-18-
interest is to see what kind of pattern emerges, if any, in the resid-
uals of such a regression equation. However, given the length of the
time series, the Durbin-Watson statistic becomes more likely to indi-
cate insignificant serial correlation even when runs of deviations
above or below the previous price occur regularly with enough duration
that knowledgeable speculators could make money. Our observations are
separated by, on average, two weeks which is certainly long enough
even in the eighteenth century to get information, make a trade, and
observe the effect on price of the trade.
A superior technique is to estimate so-called AutoRegressive,
Integrated, Moving Average (ARIMA) models for the changes in prices.
If it can be found that some combination of autogressive and moving
average processes yield consistently good descriptions of price
changes, then presumably these processes could be discovered by
interested speculators and used to make profits in the markets. The
results of two different techniques for estimating ARMA models are
shown in Table 4. For efficient markets to have existed, these models
should show (0,0)— i.e., that last period's price alone remains the
best predictor of this period's price.
Both the "Uni" and the "APARMA" methods are strictly mechanical
procedures that estimate the autocorrelation coefficients and the par-
tial correlation coefficients for up to 10 lags over the time series.
The "Uni", or standard Box-Jenkins method, determines which of these
coefficients are statistically significant from zero and then the
investigator selects the most plausible model. (Box and Jenkins,
1970.) The APARMA method is a recursive process in which each auto-
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Table 4
Estimated ARMA Models
for Bank of England and East India Company
Stock Price Changes in London and Amsterdam
Bank of England
Time Period London Amsterdam
Uni APARMA Uni APARMA
1723-1794 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
1723-1737
1738-1794
1748-1756
1763-1778
1782-1792
1739-1748
1756-1763
1778-1782
East India Company
1723-1794 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3
1723-1737
1738-1794
1748-1756
1763-1778
1732-1792
1739-1748
1756-1763
1778-1782
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
0,2 0,0 0,1 0,0
2,0 2,0 0,0 0,1
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
3,0 3,0 0,0 0,0
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
0,0 0,0 0,1 1,0
0,0 0,0 2,0 0,0
0,0 0,0 3,0 3,0
0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2
0,0 0,0 3,0 0,0
0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
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regressive process up to order 10 is estimated and then the residuals
of each estimate are used to calculate variances. The process which
minimizes the expression:
2
log ff + 2k/ n,
where k is the order of autoregressive process and n is the number of
observations. Then by least squares, ARMA models are estimated up to
order (p,5) where p is the order of AR model selected above. Finally,
the residuals of the estimated ARMA models are used to calculate
sample variances and (p,q) selected which minimizes:
log(a2 ) + ((log n)/n)(p + q)
P > Q
where q is the order of moving average process. (Hannan and Rissanen,
1983.) The tests are repeated for various subperiods , corresponding
to the peacetime and wartime periods selected above.
For the period as a whole, both methods are consistent in showing
market efficiency in both markets for Bank of England stock and in the
London market for East India Company stock. Both methods indicate
that a (0,3), i.e., a third-order moving-average process, existed in
the Amsterdam prices of the East India Company. This appears to be in
place only after 1737, however. Only in the London market for East
India stock do we find consistent evidence in each sub-period that an
efficient market was maintained. In the two markets for Bank of
England stock we find sub-periods when some kind of ARMA process seems
to have been at work. It is interesting, however, that these never
occur in both markets for any given sub-period. The implied 6 weeks
-21-
lag in price determination of East India Company stock on the
Amsterdam exchange may reflect rescontre dates, which while normally
every 3 months for the English stocks may have been shortened by half
for the more active stock. (Cope mentions the emergence of 6 weeks
rescontre dates on the London Stock Exchange in 1758.) (Cope, p.
16.) The failure of a similar pattern to emerge in Bank of England
stock may be due to less speculative investing in this stock, par-
ticularly by the Dutch. (Carter found that Bank of England stock was
owned only in very large amounts by Dutch investors.) (Carter,
1953c.)
To reach a preliminary conclusion, efficient markets for the
leading British financial securities appear to be in place in both
Amsterdam and London immediately after the South Sea Bubble of 1720.
Moreover, they seem to have continued to operate efficiently up to the
outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars at the end of the century.
Various episodes of market inefficiencies leading to speculative
profit possibilities probably did arise at times when the political
relationships between England and Holland altered. These periods
merit closer examination by financial historians of both countries, as
well as more refined tests of the efficient markets hypothesis by
economists. The results should prove informative to both historians
and economists.
-22-
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